Stock Market Reaction To Chief Marketing Officer Appointment Announcements

This paper investigates the stock price performance of 166 firms appointing a new Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) between 1999 and 2005. Following event study methodology, the results reveal that abnormal stock returns around the appointment day are greater for firms appointing a CMO with prior marketing executive experience, in firms where the new CMO explains the intended future marketing strategy on the appointment announcement day, whereas it is lower in firms operating in higher growth, high technology industries with higher product differentiation. Announcement-induced returns are also greater for firms that experienced poor stock price performance in the year leading to the appointment. Taken together, the results suggest that the market’s assessment of a change in marketing leadership should not be viewed as being uniformly beneficial, but should be assessed against the profile of the appointee and the appointing firm

Operating Performance Around the Adoption of Director Incentive Plans

Abstract Recently, numerous firms adopted incentive compensation plans for their outside directors. This study examines empirically the hypothesis that the adoption of such plans helps to improve the adopting firm's operating performance by aligning the interests of directors and shareholders. The empirical tests do not reveal a significant link between the adoption of director incentive plans and operating performance improvements. Potential explanations for these findings are discussed

Shareholder Lawsuits and Ownership Structure

This paper examines shareholder litigation activity in the backdrop of corporate ownership structure.  The main insight of this paper is that shareholder litigation and ownership structure appear to be substitute mechanisms in disciplining management.  Partly consistent with this notion, empirical results suggest that lawsuit-defendant firms have fewer outside blockholders, a lower percentage of unaffiliated blockholdings, and a lower blockholdings-to-blockholders ratio than a set of control firms

De la "tercera civilización helénica" al "paciente en el quirófano": antiparlamentarismo y anticomunismo en el régimen del 4 de Agosto de 1936 y en la dictadura del

RESUMEN: Este artículo aclara la ideología de la Dictadura del 21 de abril de 1967 en Grecia, al comparar y yuxtaponer su discurso oficial con la ideología del régimen del 4 de agosto, establecido por Ioannis Metaxas en 1936. A través de esta comparación, el artículo expone que el régimen de Metaxas no sólo fue el precedente histórico de la Dictadura de los Coroneles, sino que constituyó su principal fuente de inspiración ideológica, al proporcionar una serie de esquemas interpretativos generales así como simples prácticas discursivas con el fin de establecer su discurso antiparlamentarista y anticomunista y, de este modo, legitimarse. Además, el artículo sostiene que, a pesar de las semejanzas, habrá tres diferencias clave entre los discursos en cuestión. En primer lugar el régimen de Metaxas se consideraba a sí mismo como una ruptura histórica real, lo que significaba una nueva épica en la historia de la nación, los Coroneles presentaban su Dictadura como un mero paréntesis en la vida parlamentaria del país. En segundo lugar, mientras Metaxas, en su dis- curso político, atacaba al régimen parlamentario abiertamente y de forma agresiva, los Coroneles se limitaban simplemente a degradar las formas parlamentarias que presuntamente habían calado en Grecia en el período inmediatamente anterior a la Junta. En tercer lugar, el régimen de Metaxas quería provocar una transformación radical de toda la sociedad, mientras los Coroneles sólo querían intervenir en el terreno político. Para finalizar el artículo continúa con la explicación de estas diferencias de discurso, ligando sus manifestaciones ideológicas a los diversos contextos sociohistóricos: el período europeo de entreguerras y la crisis del capitalismo liberal, por una lado, y el anticomunismo general de la Guerra Fría, por otro. Palabras clave: Regímenes, Postguerra, Entreguerras, Grecia, Ideología, Discurso. ABSTRACT: This article illuminates the ideology of the April 21st 1967 Dictatorship in Greece through comparing and juxtaposing its official discourse with that of the “4th of August Regime”, the dictatorship established by Ioannis Metaxas in 1936. Through the comparison, the paper argues that the Metaxas regime not only was the historical predecessor of the Colonels’ dictatorship, but in many ways constituted the main source of ideological inspiration providing a variety of general interpretive schemes as well as simple discursive practices in order to found its antiparliamentary and anticommunist discourse and thus legitimize itself. The paper furthermore argues that, despite similarities, there were three key differences between the discourses in question. Firstly, while the Metaxas regime perceived of itself as a real historical break, signifying a new age in the history of the nation, the Colonels portrayed their dictatorship as a mere parenthesis in the country’s parliamentary life. Secondly, whereas Metaxas openly and aggressively attacked parliamentarism in his political discourse, the Colonels were limited in merely degrading the parliamentary form that had allegedly soaked Greece just before the junta. Thirdly, the Metaxas regime claimed to evoke a holistic radical transformation of society, whereas the Colonels just wanted to intervene in the sphere of politics. Finally, the article proceeds to account for these discursive differences by inducing their ideological manifestations to their different socio-historical contexts: The European Mid-War period and the crisis of liberal capitalism, on the one hand, to the general Cold War anticommunism, on the other. Keywords: Regimes, Post-war, Mid-war, Greece, Ideology, Discours

Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence

I posit and test two competing views on the significance of outside director tenure lengths; the "expertise" hypothesis suggesting that extended board service time is a sign of director commitment, experience, and competence and the "management-friendliness" hypothesis suggesting that extended board service time marks directors who befriend management at the expense of shareholders. I find evidence that Senior directors, defined as directors with twenty or more years of board service, are almost twice as likely to occupy a 'management-affiliated' profession compared to the rest, and that they are also more likely to staff the firm's nominating and compensation committees. Senior director participation in the compensation committee is associated with higher pay for the CEO, especially when the CEO is more powerful in the firm. These results are consistent with the management-friendliness hypothesis, and highlight a need for setting term limits for directors. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003.